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Abstract
In this paper we test computationally the performance of CAPM
in an evolutionary setting. In particular we study the stability of
wealth distribution in a financial market where some traders invest
as prescribed by CAPM and others behave according to different
portfolio rules. Our study is motivated by recent analytical results
that show that, whenever a logarithmic utility maximiser enters the
market, traders who either “believe” in CAPM and use it as a rule of
thumb for their portfolio decisions, or are endowed with genuine mean-
variance preferences, vanish in the long run. Our analysis provides
further insights and extends these results. We simulate a sequence of
trades in a financial market and: first, we address the issue of how
long is the long run in different parametric settings; second, we study
the effect of heterogeneous savings behaviour on asymptotic wealth
shares. We find that CAPM is particularly “unfit” for highly risky
environments.
JEL Classification C61, D81, G11
Keywords Evolution; portfolio rules; CAPM ; Kelly criterion.
1 Introduction
A major part of research in financial economics is aimed at improving our
understanding of how investors make their portfolio decisions and hence of
how asset prices are determined. In this paper we contribute to that re-
search adopting a dynamic approach, where investors’ wealth endowments
and portfolio rules evolve in time.
We adopt here an evolutionary framework to address the issues of fit-
ness and survival in financial markets, where traders differ in portfolio rules
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and/or savings behaviour. We build a simple framework that allows us to
simulate a long sequence of trades in a competitive financial market and to
test computationally the asymptotic wealth distribution of traders who fol-
low heterogeneous portfolio rules. In particular we concentrate our analysis
on the interaction between two types of traders: traders who use (the tradi-
tional version of) CAPM as a rule of thumb for their portfolio decisions and
traders who make portfolio choices maximising a logarithmic utility function.
The choice of this particular focus of analysis is motivated by an old de-
bate and a recent strand of literature. Despite the fact that its restrictive
assumptions have often been criticised and its predictive power has been chal-
lenged by numerous contribution in empirical finance (see for example Fama
and French[4, 5]), the mean variance approach is a standard in financial eco-
nomics, and its main corollary in asset pricing, the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin
Capital Asset Pricing Model 1, has been viewed as one of the “major contri-
butions of academic research in the postwar era” (Jagannathan and Wang [9],
p.4). Since a seminal article by Kelly [10], financial economists and applied
probability theorists have been debating on the normative appeal of loga-
rithmic utility maximisation as opposed to the mean-variance approach in
financial markets. Several contributors2 have expressed their dissatisfaction
with the mean-variance approach and argued that a rational investor with
a long time horizon should instead maximise the expected rate of growth
of his wealth. The portfolio choice that this type of behaviour implies is
equivalent to that prescribed by a logarithmic utility function (the so called
“Kelly criterion”). Central to the debate was the claim that maximising a
logarithmic utility function would be a “more rational” objective to follow
for a trader with a long time horizon. This claim has been strongly opposed
by Merton and Samuelson [13] and Goldman [7], who stressed the obvious
contradiction that lies in arguing that rational traders should maximise a
given utility function, possibly different from their own.
We believe that a useful contribution to this debate comes by the adoption
of an evolutionary technique. By showing that logarithmic utility maximisers
accumulate more wealth than CAPM-traders we certainly do not prove that
they are more rational (or happier) than their mean-variance opponents.
1See Sharpe [17], Lintner [12] and Mossin [14].
2For example: Latane [11], Breiman [3], Hakansson [8], Finkelstein and Whitley [6],
Algoet and Cover [1].
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However we may gain a better understanding of the reasons for the support
of logarithmic utility maximisation that originated the debate.
We do not attempt here a review on the literature on evolution and mar-
ket behaviour. Instead we concentrate on the more self-contained strand of
literature to which this paper specifically contributes. In particular, we focus
on the literature that aims at studying long run financial market outcomes
as the result of a process akin to natural selection. In a seminal paper Blume
and Easley [2] develop an evolutionary model of a financial market and de-
fine notions of dominance, survival and extinction based on the asymptotic
behaviour of traders’ wealth shares. They provide us with the most general
analytical result in this strand of literature. They show that, if all traders
save at the same rate and under some uniform boundedness conditions on
portfolios, then there exists one globally fittest portfolio rule which is pre-
scribed by logarithmic utility maximisation. Namely, if there is a logarithmic
utility maximiser in the economy, he will dominate, determine asset prices
asymptotically and drive to extinction any other trader that does not behave,
at least in the long run, as a logarithmic utility maximiser.
In a different setting, where investors choose their investment rates en-
dogenously (choosing an optimal consumption stream at the same time as an
optimal sequence of portfolios), Sandroni [15] provides analytical results that
seem to weaken Blume and Easley’s findings. He shows that, provided that
agents’ utilities satisfy Inada conditions (and that agents’ beliefs are correct),
then all traders survive. Clearly Inada conditions are crucial here as they
require marginal utilities to go to infinity whenever the consumption level ap-
proaches zero. A rational trader that can also choose his investment intensity
would avoid extinction by suitably modifying his consumption pattern.
Sciubba [16] compares the relative fitness of logarithmic and mean-variance
preferences. Mean-variance preferences do not satisfy Inada conditions and
prescribe portfolio weights which do not necessarily display uniform bounded-
ness properties, so that none of the two previous frameworks directly applies.
She shows that when logarithmic utility maximisers invest at the same rate
as mean-variance investors, logarithmic traders dominate, determine asset
prices asymptotically and drive to extinction those agents who are either en-
dowed with mean-variance preferences, ore use their theoretical predictions
(CAPM) as a rule of thumb. One of the sections in Sciubba [16] is indeed
devoted to the study of the role of heterogeneous savings rates in the dy-
namics of wealth accumulation. However, the stochastic process becomes so
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complex in this case, that the few results that are obtainable analytically are
very weak. This is where we believe that numerical computation can provide
us with more insights into the problem.
Our results show that, even when we allow for heterogeneity in savings
rates, dominance of logarithmic utility maximisers proves robust, at least
to a certain extent. In particular, we show that logarithmic traders can “af-
ford” to save at a lower rate than CAPM traders and still dominate financial
markets. When logarithmic traders dominate, the wealth share of CAPM
traders converges to zero exponentially fast. In particular, we find that the
more risk-averse CAPM traders are, the faster they vanish. Clearly when
CAPM traders display a savings intensity that is much higher than their
opponents, then - as one would expect - they indeed dominate and drive to
extinction logarithmic utility maximisers. We identify the threshold in the
savings rates differential such that this “fate reversal” occurs and find that it
is increasing in the variance of the dividend stream. If the dividend stream
is very volatile, then the advantage of logarithmic utility maximisers with
respect to CAPM traders in terms of portfolio selection is higher. Hence
LOG traders can “afford” to save less and still dominate the market. Sym-
metrically, the fitness of CAPM proves particularly low in environments
characterised by high volatility. Should we trust what CAPM prescribes
when investing on Nasdaq? Probably not.
2 The Model
A detailed description of the model is to be found in Sciubba [16]. Here we
summarise its main features. Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, ....
There are S states of the world indexed by s = 1, 2, ..., S, one of which
will occur at each date. States follow an i.i.d. process with distribution
p = (p1, p2, ..., pS) where ps > 0 for all s. There is a finite set of assets,
with the same dimensionality of the set of states of nature. With little
abuse of notation we index both assets and states with the same letter.
Asset s ∈ {1, 2, ..., S} pays a strictly positive dividend ds > 0 when state
s ∈ {1, 2, ..., S} occurs and 0 otherwise. At each date there is only one unit
of each asset available, so that ds will be the total wealth in the economy
at date t if state s occurs. This wealth will be distributed among traders
proportionately according to the share of asset s that each of them owns.
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Let ρst be the market price of (one unit of) asset s at date t. There is a
heterogeneous population of long-lived agents in this economy, indexed by
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., I}. Each agent is characterised by an investment rule and an
initial wealth endowment. Agent i’s investment rule is {δit, α
i
t}
∞
t=0 where δ
i
t
denotes agent i’s investment rate at date t (i.e. the percentage of wealth
endowment at date t, eit, that i invests at date t) and α
i
t is a vector that
describes agent i’s portfolio choice at date t (i.e. the vector of portfolio
weights in the S available assets {αist}
S
s=1 for agent i at date t). Agent
i’s initial wealth endowment is denoted by ei0. The tuple
(
ei0, {δ
i
t, α
i
t}
∞
t=0
)
constitutes a complete description of agent i. At each date t, agent i invests
a portion δit of his wealth endowment e
i
t, in the S available assets
3. We denote
by wit the total amount invested by trader i at date t :
wit = δ
i
te
i
t (1)
Aggregate total investment will be equal to aggregate expenditure in assets.
Since there is only one unit of each asset available, then clearly:
S∑
s=1
ρst =
I∑
i=1
wit = wt (2)
Equation (2) provides us with a convenient normalisation for prices. We can,
in fact, call pist the normalised market price of asset s at date t and define it
as follows:
pist ≡
ρst∑S
s=1 ρst
=
ρst
wt
(3)
Finally define: pit ≡ (pi1t, pi2t, ..., piSt). In equilibrium, prices must be such
that markets clear, i.e. total demand equals total supply. Agent i’s demand
for asset s will be equal to agent i’s expenditure in asset s, αistw
i
t, divided
by the market price of asset s, ρst. In the aggregate:
I∑
i=1
αistw
i
t
ρst
= 1 (4)
Rewriting equation (4) we get:
ρst =
I∑
i=1
αistw
i
t (5)
3We are in fact assuming that agent i “eats” the rest of his endowment so that whatever
is not invested,
(
1− δi
t
)
ei
t
, is consumed by agent i.
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and using our price normalisation:
pist =
I∑
i=1
αist ε
i
t (6)
where εit denotes the investment share of agent i at date t:
εit =
wit
wt
(7)
and also measures the “presence” of trader i in financial markets and his
“importance” in determining asset prices.
2.1 The Dynamics
We now ask what is the period to period dynamics of trader i’s investment
share. This will allow us to follow the evolution of his “presence” in financial
markets and of his “importance” in determining market outcomes, namely
asset prices. Suppose that state s occurs at date t: asset s pays a dividend
ds while all other assets pay zero. The total wealth in the economy, ds, gets
distributed to traders according to the share of asset s that each of them
owns. In particular, the investment income of trader i - that also constitutes
his wealth endowment for period t + 1 - is equal to the following:
eit+1 =
αistw
i
t
ρst
ds (8)
Aggregate wealth endowment at date t + 1 is equal to the total payout of
asset s:
et+1 =
I∑
i=1
eit+1 =
I∑
i=1
αisw
i
t
ρst
ds = ds (9)
In period t + 1 trader i invests a fraction δit+1 of his wealth endowment:
wit+1 = δ
i
t+1e
i
t+1 = δ
i
t+1
αistds
ρst
wit (10)
In the aggregate:
wt+1 =
I∑
i=1
wit+1 =
I∑
i=1
δit+1
αistw
i
t
ρst
ds =
I∑
i=1
δit+1
αistw
i
t
ρst
et+1 (11)
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In order to formulate (10) in terms of wealth shares, it is useful to define the
market average investment rate δt+1 as:
δt+1 =
I∑
i=1
δit+1
αistw
i
t
ρst
(12)
so that (11) can be rewritten as:
wt+1 = δt+1et+1 (13)
Dividing (10) by (11) we obtain investment shares:
εit+1 =
wit+1
wt+1
=
δit+1α
i
stds
δt+1ρstet+1
wit (14)
Finally, using (9) and our price normalisation, we obtain:
εit+1 =
δit+1α
i
st
δt+1pist
εit (15)
Equation (15) describes the period to period dynamics of the investment
share of trader i. It implies that the “impact” of trader i on financial mar-
kets follows a fitness-monotonic dynamic: trader i’s investment share will
increase if he invests more than the market on average and if he scores, with
his investments, a payoff which is higher than the average population payoff.
In fact, if state s occurs at date t, αist and pist give us a measure of trader
i’s payoff (his bet on the lucky asset) and of the average population payoff
respectively. Following the definition given by Blume and Easley [2], in order
to establish whether trader i survives or vanishes, we consider the asymptotic
value of his investment share and we check whether it is bounded away from
zero or not. When trader i’s investment share converges 4 to zero, his signifi-
cance in determining market outcomes vanishes and he effectively disappears
from the market. When trader i’s investment share stays bounded away from
zero, then he contributes to determine asset prices (also asymptotically) and
we will say that, as a trader, he survives. The process described by eq.(15)
is too complex to be studied analytically in a very general case5. In fact,
4Here and in what follows whenever we refer to convergence, we mean almost sure
convergence.
5 I.e. without imposing some of the restrictions required, for example, by [2], [15] or
[16].
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even under the restriction that all shocks are i.i.d., asset prices and market
savings rates depend on the whole sequence of past history, and the law of
large numbers does not automatically help us with a solution. As we argued
in the introduction, this is why we believe that numerical analysis can help
to obtain further insights into the problem.
2.2 Types of Traders
As in Sciubba [16], we will consider the interaction between two different
types of traders. The first type of agents is given by investors who believe in
CAPM and use it as a rule of thumb 6: at the beginning of each time period,
they observe payoffs and market prices and work out the composition of the
market and the risk-free portfolios. Finally, according to their degree of risk
aversion they choose their preferred combination between the two. At date
t, CAPM investors choose γt ∈ [0, 1] and invest in asset s a portion α
CAPM
st
of their portfolio such that:
αCAPMst = γtα
F
st + (1− γt)α
M
st (16)
where:
αFst ≡
ρst/ds∑
z ρzt/dz
=
pist/ds∑
z pizt/dz
(17)
and
αMst ≡
ρst∑
z ρzt
= pist. (18)
The second type of traders is given by investors who are endowed with a log-
arithmic utility function (type LOG) and who actually maximise the growth
rate of their wealth share and invest according to a “simple” and time in-
variant portfolio rule:
αLOGst = ps (19)
More generally, at each date t, a rational trader i will choose {αist}
S
s=1 so as
to maximise:
S∑
s=1
psu
i
(
αistw
i
t
ρst
ds
)
(20)
6We can think of them as of traders who have been educated in business schools. They
have been taught the model so well in their finance courses that they believe it really
works.
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subject to the constraint that investment expenditure at each date is less
than or equal to the amount of wealth saved in the previous period. If ui (·)
is logarithmic, it follows that 7 αLst = ps. We will denote by δ
CAPM
t and δ
LOG
t
the investment rates of traders who believe in CAPM and logarithmic utility
maximisers respectively.
3 Computer Simulation and Numerical Re-
sults
Recall eq.(6) where normalised prices are expressed as a weighted average
of portfolio rules. In the setting that we consider, where CAPM and LOG
traders interact, eq.(6) becomes
pist = εtα
LOG
st + (1− εt)α
CAPM
st (21)
where εt denotes the investment share of LOG traders and (1 − εt) denotes
the investment share of CAPM traders. By substituting eq.(16) and eq.(19)
in eq.(21) one has
pist = εtps + (1− εt)(γ
pist
ds
1∑
z=1,N
pizt
dz
+ (1− γ)pist). (22)
We solve the above equation through iteration by a numerical technique
called “relaxation”. Namely, we start from a trial value for pist, we compute
a new value through the above equation and then we iterate this procedure
until a fixed point is reached. In other words, if we call τ the time of the
iteration our numerical code computes the quantity
piτ+1st = εtps + (1− εt)(γ
piτst
ds
1∑
z=1,N
piτ
zt
dz
+ (1− γ)piτst) (23)
and then it looks for the fixed point solution pi∞st that is achieved for all
the τ > τ ∗ for which |piτ
∗+1
st − pi
τ∗
st | is less than a tolerance parameter fixed
in advance for all the assets s. This fixed point is the numerical solution of
7Note that we are assuming that traders know the probability distribution p over the
state space S. In a more general framework, a trader who displays a logarithmic utility
function bets his beliefs.
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eq.(23). Since it has been demonstrated that this solution exists and is unique
[16], it is possible to show that the above method gives a numerical value
of the solution with a desired precision bounded only by computation time.
In our simulations we stop the iteration when the relative precision of asset
prices is lower than 10−5. At this point we run two sets of simulations. The
first set aims at detecting the time of convergence of the stochastic process
given by the wealth shares. The second set of simulations aims at checking
the robustness of LOG dominance results to heterogeneity in savings rates.
The first numerical check is devoted to study the average time one can
expect CAPM traders to survive in a competition with the others. We
run a Fortran code that simulates a real evolution in a market with CAPM
traders and LOG traders. We consider a market where 100 assets are repeat-
edly traded, so that S = 100. We assume that the probability distribution
over the states of nature is uniform, so that ps = 1/S, ∀s. We assume that
dividends are randomly drawn from a normal distribution N(µ, σ) with the
mean to variance ratio large enough to guarantee that virtually every asset
pays a positive payoff. We set the initial investment shares for the two types
of traders to be equal. None of the qualitative results that we obtain in the
simulation are driven by our choice of parameters and probability distribu-
tions. We run our simulations under the assumption (as in Sciubba [16] and
Blume and Easley [2]) that both types of traders save at the same rate. Time
step after time step the code generates pseudo-random numbers that identify
states of nature. After each draw, prices are computed through “relaxation”,
the dividends are distributed and the investment shares of the traders are
refreshed. Eventually the investment share of CAPM traders becomes lower
than a certain threshold, sufficiently small such that we can conclude that
CAPM traders are extinct. We then store in the computer the time at which
this threshold is reached and we start again with a new realisation of the same
market. Given the same initial conditions in the market, we collect up to
15000 different realisations of this competition between traders. The various
realisations differ because of the randomness in the draw of the states of
nature. In all the runs CAPM traders see their investment shares reduced
until extinction takes place. This result confirms the theoretical findings.
Furthermore, through the extinction times recorded by the computer code,
we are also able to measure the density function describing the probabil-
ity that CAPM traders survive up to a time t in a competition with LOG
traders. The unit of time is given by the draw of a state of nature. That
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is, t = 5 means that after the initial condition 5 states of nature have been
drawn in the market, and the 5 corresponding assets paied their dividends.
The main result is that the density function is exponential. The probability
for a CAPM trader to survive decreases with time according to
P (t)dt = Ae−Ctdt. (24)
We also run different simulations by changing the parameter γ of the model,
that measures the risk-aversion of CAPM traders. The result is that the
more risk-averse the CAPM traders are, the faster their wealth share con-
verges to zero. The economic intuition for this result lies in the fact that a
higher degree of risk-aversion implies that the portfolio of CAPM is tilted to-
wards the risk-free rather than towards the market portfolio, where the most
successful trading rules are represented. In this setting, a CAPM trader
with an extremely low risk-aversion, and hence a value of γ approximately
equal to zero, would indeed survive.
Our simulations show that exponential decay is robust with respect to
the values of γ used. The functional form that can be hypothesised for such
a decay is of the form
P (t) = Ae−Btγ
2
(25)
One can test this assumption by rescaling the different data. Namely in each
simulation, if we multiply the value of time by the value of γ2 used in that
run, we should obtain different functions P ′(t′) (where t′ = tγ2) all behaving
in the same way. In particular these data obtained through simulations with
different values of γ should collapse together. This technique note as “collapse
plot” is shown in Fig.1. In the upper part of the figure we plot the data
relative to γ = 0.5, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1 testing the good validity of our assumption.
We also run another set of simulations, by changing the threshold at which
the CAPM trader is considered extinct. By passing to a threshold of 0.5% of
the total wealth shares from the 5% previously used, we noticed as expected
a shift of the distribution to longer times. Nevertheless, qualitatively we
obtain the same behaviour shown in the lower part of Fig.1. In both cases
(above and below) the extimated exponential distribution is indicated by a
dashed line.
In the second set of simulations we consider the situation in which the
savings rates used by the two types of traders differ. In particular, we ask
if LOG traders can survive and eventually dominate over CAPM traders
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that save at a higher intensity. We run simulations of the financial market
described in the previous section, in this case under the assumption that
traders have heterogeneous savings rates. Our aim is to check whether LOG
dominance results are robust when CAPM traders save at a higher rate
than logarithmic utility maximisers. As in the previous set of simulations, we
consider a market where 100 assets are repeatedly traded, such that S = 100.
Again, we assume that the probability distribution over the states of nature
is uniform, so that ps = 1/S, ∀s. We assume that dividends are randomly
drawn from a normal distribution N(µ, σ) with the mean to variance ratio
large enough to guarantee that virtually every asset pays a positive payoff.
We set the initial wealth shares for the two types of traders to be equal.
Finally we normalise the savings rate of CAPM traders to be equal to one.
Fig. 2 shows the lowest value for logarithmic utility maximisers’ savings
rate that still allows LOG traders to dominate (averaged across 1000 differ-
ent simulations), for different values of the variance σ of the distribution of
dividends, which measures the volatility of the dividend stream. More par-
ticularly, we introduce the quantity ∆ representing the maximum difference
in saving rates between CAPM and LOG that still allows LOG traders to
dominate. Also in this case we apply the technique of the collapse plot in or-
der to show that the threshold at which LOG traders commence to dominate
depends on the ratio σ/µ. We can interpret the graph in figure 2 as dividing
the σ, ∆ plane in two regions: in the area (a) below the graph, logarithmic
utility maximisers dominate and drive to extinction CAPM traders; in the
area (b) above the graph, CAPM traders dominate and drive to extinction
logarithmic utility maximisers. From our results it appears that the domi-
nance of logarithmic utility maximisers is robust to heterogeneity in savings
rates, at least to a certain extent. In fact we obtain that LOG traders dom-
inate and drive CAPM traders to extinction even when the latter display
a higher savings rate (provided that it is not much higher). This difference
provides us with an immediate measure of the advantage of LOG traders
with respect to CAPM traders in terms of portfolio rules. We find that
the higher the volatility of the dividend stream, the higher is the advantage
of logarithmic utility maximisers over CAPM traders. In particular, the
threshold level for the LOG traders’ savings rate appears to be a function
of the mean to variance ratio of the probability distribution of the dividends
that assets pay. The economic intuition of this result lies in the fact that,
with a large variance of dividends, the behaviour prescribed by a logarith-
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mic utility function differs greatly from the behaviour prescribed by CAPM.
Think of the following example. Suppose that investors can place bets on
two lotteries that pay positive prizes with equal probability: lottery ”Rich”
pays 1 million dollars with probability 1/2 and lottery ”Poor” pays 1 single
dollar whenever lottery ”Rich” does not pay. A LOG investor would place
equal bets on both lotteries. On the contrary, a CAPM trader (and any
trader, in fact, that maximises the expected value of an increasing function
of his wealth level, rather than rate of growth) would place a higher bet
on the ”Rich” lottery than on the ”Poor” one. The divergence between his
bets would be increasing in the difference between the two lotteries’ prizes.
As a result, the distance between the bets that LOG investors and CAPM
investors would place is also increasing in the discrepancy between lotteries’
payoffs. A higher variance of dividends implies that, in different states of
nature, very high payoffs are paid as well as very low ones, and results in a
higher divergence of portfolio choices between the two types of investors.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we test computationally the performance of CAPM in an evo-
lutionary setting. In particular we study the asymptotic wealth distribution
across two types of traders that compete on financial markets: traders who
invest as prescribed by CAPM and traders who maximise the expected value
of a logarithmic utility function of wealth. Our study provides further in-
sights and extends some recent analytical results (see [16]) that prove that
the wealth share of CAPM traders converges almost surely to zero, when
a logarithmic utility maximiser with a savings rate at least as large as the
savings rate of CAPM traders, enters the market. We run two sets of sim-
ulation addressing two related, but separate, issues. First, we look at the
time of convergence of the stochastic process given by the wealth share dy-
namics. We find that, when savings rates are identical across the two types
of traders, the wealth share of CAPM investors decreases exponentially fast
towards zero. We also find that the degree of risk-aversion of CAPM traders
has a role in determining the speed of convergence: the more risk-averse the
CAPM traders, the faster their wealth share converges to zero. Second, we
check the robustness of the analytical result in Sciubba [16] to heterogeneity
in savings rates. We find that LOG investors dominate even when their sav-
13
ings rate is lower (but not too much lower) than the savings rate of CAPM
traders. We compute the maximum difference between the savings rates of
the two types of investors that still allows LOG traders to dominate and drive
to extinction all those who choose their portfolio according to what CAPM
prescribes. We argue that the difference between savings rates so computed
can serve as a measure of the fitness of logarithmic utility maximisation with
respect to CAPM and we find that it is increasing in the variance of the
dividend stream. Our results seem to suggest that, from an evolutionary
perspective, if it is true that CAPM could perform almost as satisfactorily
as logarithmic utility maximisation in markets with low volatility, it proves
particularly unfit for highly risky environments.
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Figure 1: Different density functions for the lasting probability for different
values of γ. In the picture above a threshold of 5% of aggregate wealth has
been adopted to claim traders’ extinction. In the picture below we used a
threshold ten times lower. This change affects only the scale of time and the
parameters of the fit, but it does not affect the form of the distribution.
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Figure 2: Values of ∆ (the maximum difference between the savings rates of
CAPM and LOG that still allows LOG traders to dominate), with respect
to the dividends’ volatility σ.
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